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An Ambiguous Request for Counsel Before, 
and Not After a Miranda Waiver: United States v. 
Rodriguez, United States v. Fry and State v. Blackburn
By Harvey Gee
1
Fifteen years ago, in Davis v. United States,
2 the
Supreme Court considered the degree of clarity
necessary for a custodial suspect to invoke the
Miranda right to counsel after a waiver.3 Davis
decided the issue of how clearly a criminal suspect must
assert his Fifth Amendment right to counsel.4 The Court
held that after a suspect knowingly and voluntarily
waives his rights, law enforcement officers may con-
tinue their questioning unless the suspect clearly re-
quests an attorney.5 The Court reasoned that although
agents continued ques-
tioning Davis after he
stated, “I think I want a
lawyer before I say any-
thing else,”6 the contin-
ued questioning did not




Davis, unless a suspect
unambiguously requests
counsel, law enforcement
officers need not stop questioning him.8 Davis marked
a departure from the Fifth Amendment’s requirement
that the government bear the entire burden of protecting
an individual’s privilege against self-incrimination.  Mi-
randa v. Arizona9 held that “[i]f the individual desires
to exercise his privilege, he has the right to do so.”10 The
Davis decision, however, allows the lower courts, as a
constitutional as well as a practical matter, broad latitude
to interpret or ignore ambiguous requests.11
Because the Court never expressly stated that its
ruling and rationale applied to pre-Miranda waiver sit-
uations as well as post-waiver requests, Davis left open
the question of whether its objective test applies in pre-
waiver situations.12 Since Davis, there have been sev-
eral instructive cases in which an ambiguous request for
counsel was made before Miranda warnings.  To begin,
in United States v. Rodriguez13 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Nelson v. Mc-
Carthy,14 a case decided before Davis that required po-
lice officers to clarify any ambiguous requests for 
counsel made during an interrogation, was not abrogated
by Davis.15 Relying on Nelson’s requirement that pre-
waiver clarification of a suspect’s request concerning
his Miranda rights must be made, Judge Milan D.
Smith, Jr., wrote, “a duty rests with the interrogating of-
ficer to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general
interrogation.”16 The Ninth Circuit found that the inter-
rogator should have clarified Rodriguez’s ambiguous
statement, and it reversed the district court’s decision to
admit Rodriguez’s subsequent incriminating state-
ments.17 Following Ro-
driguez, the U.S. District
Court for the District of
Idaho held in United
States v. Fry18 that an am-
biguous request concern-
ing the right to counsel
requires the interviewing
officer to stop any ques-
tioning, and to clarify and
determine whether the
statement was a request
for counsel.19 Last
spring, in State v. Blackburn,20 the South Dakota
Supreme Court similarly held that in a pre-waiver situ-
ation where the accused has not yet expressly waived
his Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the waiver
before proceeding with the interview.21
This Recent Development analyzes the holdings
of Rodriguez, Fry, and Blackburn, each of which follow
the trend of a number of state and federal courts in de-
clining to extend the Davis rule to pre-waiver situations.
These courts have largely rested their reasoning on what
Davis did not say.  This Recent Development examines
the emerging judicial trends regarding ambiguous re-
quests for counsel.  It focuses on the reasoning and con-
clusions of the state and federal courts which have
interpreted the case since Davis.  The jurisprudence that
has developed during this intervening period shows that
until the Supreme Court revisits the issue of ambiguous
request for counsel, lower courts will continue to refer
to decisions made by other state courts and federal cir-
cuits for guidance or to build on their own precedent as
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the Ninth Circuit and the North Dakota Supreme Court
have done.
This discussion and examination is divided into
five sections.  Part II reviews the basic tenets of Miranda
v. Arizona, and argues that having questioning cease if
a criminal suspect says that they want an attorney, re-
gardless of whether it is pre or post-waiver, is faithful
to the sprit and ruling of Miranda.  Part III examines
some of the holdings in different fora that have limited
the reach of Davis.  Part IV advocates that courts should
adopt the “clarification approach” espoused by Justice
David Souter in his concurrence in Davis, an argument
that I believe is grounded in reality and is consistent
with notions of judicial restraint and stare decisis.  Part
V discusses the lower courts’ treatment of pre-waiver
ambiguous requests for counsel in cases subsequent to
Davis.  Part VI summarizes the legal reasoning in the
Rodriguez, Fry, and Blackburn decisions and discusses
how these cases support the argument that the burden to
clarify ambiguous requests for counsel before a waiver
should be shouldered by police interrogators and not by
suspects.
A. the landmark Decision
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for five of the
nine members of the Court, stated that “if the individual
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning . . . that he wants an attorney, the interroga-
tion must cease until an attorney is present.”22 Central
to the Miranda decision was the strong interest in pro-
tecting suspects from coercion during interrogation.23
Based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, Miranda created a prophylactic rule to
aid in judicial review of custodial interrogations.24 If
adequate warnings are not provided, then a confession
is considered tainted.25 Although the confession may
not be voluntary, courts will at least have greater confi-
dence in any confession that is obtained.26
There are three key principles that should be
noted in Miranda.  First, the Supreme Court in Miranda
created rights for suspects during a custodial interroga-
tion.27 Miranda and its progeny have served as well-
settled legal protections afforded to suspects.  Professor
Laurence Tribe remarks, 
In Miranda . . . the Supreme Court was
consciously constructing a prophylactic
set of rules whose enforcement was be-
lieved to be one reasonable way—not
necessarily the only reasonable way—
of implementing the core constitutional
value at stake . . . .28
Second, the language contained within the Mi-
randa decision is evidence of the Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation of a suspect’s invocation of his right
to counsel.29 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that
“‘[i]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a
constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel
does not depend on a request.’  This proposition applies
with equal force in the context of providing counsel to
protect an accused’s Fifth Amendment privilege in the
face of interrogation.”30 The Court concluded that “if
the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior
to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent,
the interrogation must cease.”31 Miranda’s “in any man-
ner” language is indicative of the Supreme Court’s
broad allowance for exercise of the right to counsel.32
Third, the Miranda Court was concerned with
the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interro-
gations.  The Miranda Court suggested that the suspect
should be given the benefit of the doubt in the interpre-
tation of ambiguous requests for counsel.33 Miranda was
an opportunity for the Supreme Court to express its dis-
satisfaction with the due process “totality of the circum-
stances” test as an exclusive means of regulating
confessions.34
Competing interests forced the Warren Court to
balance the needs of law enforcement against the sus-
pect’s right against self-incrimination.35 While the Court
recognized the importance of effective law enforcement,
it warned against coercive police conduct.36 Throughout
its opinion, the Court repeatedly referred to the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which
guarantees to all people the privilege to be free from
compulsory self-incrimination, and it subsequently em-
phasized that “[t]he right to counsel established in Mi-
randa [is not itself] . . . protected by the Constitution
but [was established] to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination was protected.”37 In em-
phasizing that an individual is afforded his privilege
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution not to
be compelled to incriminate himself, Chief Justice Earl
Warren eloquently wrote,
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so
fundamental to our system of constitu-
II.   Miranda v. arizona
tional rule and the expedient of giving
an adequate warning as to the availabil-
ity of the privilege so simple, we will
not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the defendant was aware of his
rights without a warning being given . .
. . [W]hatever the background of the
person interrogated, a warning at the
time of the interrogation is indispensa-
ble to overcome its pressures and to in-
sure that the individual knows he is free
to exercise the privilege at that point in
time.38
Miranda addressed the practical considerations
and the constitutional issues implicated by unrestricted
custodial interrogation.  A primary motivation behind
Miranda was the Court’s view that a police interrogation
is an inherently intimidating and coercive procedure.39
The Court observed,
[T]he ease with which the questions put
to [the accused] may assume an inquisi-
torial character, the temptation to press
the witness unduly, to browbeat him if
he be timid or reluctant, to push him into
a corner, and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions . . . made the [criminal
justice] system so odious as to give rise
to a demand for its total abolition.40
Miranda implemented procedural safeguards to
protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination while being subjected to custodial in-
terrogation.41 In practical terms, prior to any question-
ing, the person taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any state-
ment he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attor-
ney, either retained or appointed.42 The language from
Miranda states that if a suspect “indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wished to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no ques-
tioning.”43
Was Miranda as significant a barrier to obtaining
confessions as law enforcement would like the public to
believe?  Measuring the efficacy of Miranda has never
been an easy task.  According to Professor George
Thomas, the studies have offered different results in
measure of whether the reading of Miranda warnings
leads to more or less confessions.44 He explains that the
local police administering the warnings have varying at-
titudes in conducting interrogation and measuring their
compliance with Supreme Court doctrine.45 Neverthe-
less, Professor Thomas argues that even within the ju-
dicial system there is no consensus about a direct
Miranda effect on confessions, and concludes that there
are no significant statistical differences found.46
There are also the constant variables that should
be considered.  Professor Thomas acknowledges that
some people are discouraged from making admissions
when they are provided a Miranda warning while others
see the warning as encouragement to speak to the po-
lice.47 Correspondingly, Professor Steven Duke sug-
gests there are many factors influencing confession rates
that have no relevance within the context of a pre-inter-
rogation warning, including: (1) interrogation expertise
of the police; (2) time available for the interrogation;
and (3) the urgency of the interrogation.48
b.    the Weakening and Narrowing of Miranda
A survey of Supreme Court cases from 1966 to
1994 reveals that Miranda has been weakened over
time.49 The Court continued narrowing down the scope
of Miranda guarantees by limiting the application of the
exclusionary rule to Miranda violations.50 More specif-
ically, the Court allowed the admission of statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda for the purpose of
impeachment at trial 51 and has limited the application
of the exclusionary rule by creating a “public safety ex-
ception” to Miranda’s warning requirements.52 In these
cases, the Court offered a narrow reading of the Mi-
randa protections with respect to interrogation, waiver,
and invocation.53 Further, Miranda’s scope in the con-
text of waiver was limited in Oregon v. Bradshaw54
when the Court examined the waiver of counsel rights
subsequent to invocation and required a court to first de-
termine whether the accused initiated further conversa-
tions with the interrogators, and if so, ascertain whether
this constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of Mi-
randa rights.55
These decisions have since blurred the bright–
line rule originally established in Miranda and perhaps
implicitly created a way to circumvent that rule. 56 As a
result, it has become more difficult for both police offi-
cers and lower courts to know when a confession has
been lawfully obtained.57 However, in Edwards v. Ari-
zona58 the strength and resilience of Miranda returned.59
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In Edwards, the Court fine-tuned the application of Mi-
randa and created “a second layer of prophylaxis for the
Miranda right to counsel.”60 The Edwards Court held
that when an accused invokes the right to counsel, all
questioning must cease until counsel arrives or until the
accused initiates further conversation.61
The applicability of the Edwards bright–line rule
was further clarified by a wave of four cases: Smith v.
Illinois,62 Connecticut v. Barrett,63 Arizona v. Rober-
son,64 and Minnick v. Mississippi.65 While recognizing
the diverse handling of the issue among the various
lower courts, the Supreme Court chose not to address
the issue directly.66 The defendant in Smith, after being
informed of his counsel rights,
replied, “Uh yeah. I’d like to do
that.”67 The Court found no am-
biguity in this request.68 De-
spite the bright–line rule set
forth by Edwards, the Court had
to later determine when the Ed-
wards protections would be
triggered.69
The Smith Court found
the defendant’s statement to be
a clear and unequivocal request
for counsel and consequently
found no need to address the
level of clarity such a request
requires.70 The Court’s lan-
guage in Smith supports a nar-
row approach to invocation.71
Nonetheless, the Smith Court
concluded that “[w]here noth-
ing about the request for coun-
sel or the circumstances leading
up to the request would render it ambiguous, all ques-
tioning must cease.”72
In Davis, the Supreme Court considered the de-
gree of clarity necessary for a custodial suspect to in-
voke the Miranda right to counsel after a waiver.73 Until
Davis, the Supreme Court had yet to resolve the ques-
tion of what legal effect, if any, should be afforded to an
accused’s use of equivocal or ambiguous language when
invoking Miranda rights during a police interrogation.74
Without a clear rule from the high Court, three diverse
approaches emerged in the state and lower federal
courts: (1) the “threshold-of clarity” standard, (2) the
“per se invocation” standard, and (3) the “clarification”
standard.75 Under the threshold-of-clarity rule, some ju-
risdictions required invocations of the right to counsel
to be direct and unambiguous before they were given
any legal effect.76 Conversely, other courts embraced a
per se standard and treated any invocation as legally suf-
ficient to bar any further police interrogation.77
In Davis, the Court decided that law enforce-
ment officers are not required to cease questioning im-
mediately upon the making of an ambiguous or
equivocal reference for an attorney.78 The Davis Court
held that after a suspect know-
ingly and voluntarily waives his
Miranda rights, law enforce-
ment officers may continue
their questioning until and un-
less the suspect clearly requests
an attorney.79 The Court rea-
soned that although agents con-
tinued to question Davis after
he stated, “I think I want a
lawyer before I say anything
else,”80 the continued question-




In Davis, a sailor in the
United States Navy was beaten
to death with a pool cue, and his
body was discovered the next
morning on a loading dock be-
hind the Charleston Naval Base
commissary.82 The Naval Investigative Service (“NIS”)
interviewed Davis on the USS MAHAN, his assigned
military duty station.83 Prior to the interrogation, the ac-
cused was advised of his right to speak with an attorney
and to have an attorney present during questioning
under Miranda and Article 31 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.84 Davis subsequently gave an oral and
written waiver of these rights. 85 Approximately an hour
and a half into the interrogation, Davis stated, “Maybe
I should talk to a lawyer.”86 Discussions continued with
Davis in an attempt to clarify if he was asserting his
right to counsel.87 Davis was asked if he was asking for
a lawyer or just making a comment about a lawyer.88
According to the agent, Davis responded, “No, I’m not
asking for a lawyer—[n]o, I don’t want a lawyer.”89
III.   the lImIts oF davis v. United states:




clarity rule, some jurisdic-
tions required invocations
of the right to counsel to
be direct and unambigu-
ous before they were
given any legal effect.
Conversely, other courts
embraced a per se stan-
dard and treated any in-
vocation as legally
sufficient to bar any fur-
ther police interrogation.
After a short break, the NIS agents briefly reminded
Davis of his Article 31 and Miranda rights and contin-
ued the interrogation.90 An hour later, Davis exclaimed,
“I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.”91
The interrogation was then terminated.92
At trial, the military judge denied Davis’ motion
to suppress the statements he made during the interro-
gation, and determined that the initial phraseology used
by Davis was not a request for counsel.93 The Court of
Military Appeals affirmed, holding that Davis’ ambigu-
ous request did not serve to invoke his right to counsel
and that the NIS agents responded properly in seeking
to clarify the remark.94
In an attempt to establish a clear legal precedent,
the Court established a test in Davis that focused equally
on the factual and legal analysis of the ambiguous re-
quest for counsel.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justices Antonin
Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, wrote
the majority opinion.95 The majority addressed (1)
whether an ambiguous request for counsel is sufficient
to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel under Miranda and
(2) whether, per Edwards, police officers are obligated
to ask clarifying questions after an ambiguous request
for counsel.96 The Court decisively answered these
questions by holding that, after a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers
may continue questioning until the suspect clearly re-
quests an attorney and that Edwards does not limit such
questioning, by any means, to clarifying questions.97
In coming to its narrowly-focused conclusion,
the Court rationalized that the mere act of informing sus-
pects of their Miranda rights would be sufficient to
overcome deficiencies and to protect against the coerced
relinquishment of the right against self-incrimination.98
The Court viewed the more lenient approaches taken by
other jurisdictions as unnecessarily burdensome on law
enforcement.99 In adopting a more rigid rule, it reasoned
that police officers should not be “forced to make diffi-
cult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact
wants a lawyer. . .”100
The Court utilized an objective test to determine
if a suspect’s statement can be reasonably construed as
a request for counsel but was reluctant to apply a bright–
line rule to ease questioning based and ambiguous re-
quests.
Clarifying questions help protect the
rights of the suspect by ensuring that he
gets an attorney if he wants one, and
will minimize the chance of a confes-
sion being suppressed due to subsequent
judicial second-guessing as to the mean-
ing of the suspect’s statement regarding
counsel.101
The Court acknowledged that a requirement for
a clear assertion of the right to counsel may disadvan-
tage some suspects if they are unable to articulate this
right “because of fear, intimidation, or lack of linguistic
skill.”102 But in this decision, the interests of law en-
forcement won out.  The Court further mentioned that
it would be “good police practice” for officers to clarify
an ambiguous request.103 In the Court’s view, if suspects
were not required to be clear in asserting their right to
counsel, there would be an unreasonable burden placed
on officers to decide whether they can question sus-
pects.104 Furthermore, this burden would unduly hamper
information-gathering on the part of police.105
Under the Davis mandate, a suspect must clearly
articulate his desire to have counsel present such that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would un-
derstand the statement to be a request for an attorney.106
Otherwise, a post-waiver reference to an attorney cre-
ates neither an obligation for questioning to cease nor
an obligation for officers to clarify the ambiguous state-
ment.107 The officers may continue their interrogation
without fear that future statements will be suppressed.108
Davis effectively means that this police function, specif-
ically the investigative process, outweighs the individ-
ual’s rights in these circumstances.  The Davis decision
allows lower courts, as both a constitutional and a prac-
tical matter, to ignore ambiguous requests.  As such, ju-
risdictions would be free to develop their own standard
for clarity, thereby creating even more uncertainty than
before the Davis decision.  Also, lower courts would be
confronted with cases that require the second-guessing
of police judgments that a request for counsel was suf-
ficiently ambiguous to alleviate the need for clarifica-
tion.  Judges would be compelled to perform objective
inquiries into the facts surrounding the interrogation.
Statements that may be perceived as somewhat equivo-
cal can be ignored regardless of whether they are a sus-
pect’s earnest request for counsel, and as a result, the
suspect may believe that any other requests for counsel
or further objections to questioning may be futile.  
These infirmities highlight the problems inher-
ent in Davis and Davis’ inconsistency with Supreme
Court Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.  Under Davis,
an ambiguous invocation of the Miranda rights after an
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initial valid waiver is ineffective (for example where
there is a warning and waiver, questioning, and then an
ambiguous statement).109 The question remains, how-
ever, whether the Davis rationale applies to an initial
ambiguous response (for example where there is a warn-
ing followed by an ambiguous response).  As discussed
in the next section, courts have divergent opinions with
regard to this question.  Some jurisdictions have deter-
mined that it does apply, whereas other jurisdictions
have concluded that it does not.  
The invocation of Miranda rights should not be so
difficult.  Miranda rights are in place to prevent custo-
dial interrogations that are inherently coercive.  Unfor-
tunately, as illustrated by some lower courts’ decisions
after Davis, these protections are sometimes removed.110
Accordingly, because the Fifth Amendment prohibits
compelled self-incrimination, all responses to question-
ing not accompanied by a valid waiver are considered
compelled.111
Although the Davis Court did not mention when
a suspect must make a clear request for counsel, I have
previously argued that because the facts in Davis in-
volved a post-waiver invocation, the clarification rule
does not apply before a suspect waives his right to coun-
sel.112 Professor Marcy Strauss recently argued that
Davis should be seen as a limited rule, applicable only
to post-waiver invocations.113 Professor Strauss also
suggests that court decisions after Davis have made it
extremely difficult for suspects who wish to assert their
rights to do so, as many judges classify even seemingly
clear invocations as ambiguous invocations.114 Profes-
sor Strauss further urges that courts should require that
any ambiguous or equivocal request be clarified prior to
continued questioning of a suspect.115 Though in my
earlier piece I did not advocate for the adoption of a clar-
ification approach to address this issue in future cases,
the court decisions since have made clear that a clarifi-
cation approach should be applied to address ambiguous
requests for counsel in pre-wavier situations.  Just like
Professor Strauss, I would also argue that future am-
biguous request cases should follow this reasoning and
place the burden on interrogators, not suspects, to show
that that the suspect waived his Miranda rights.  A clar-
ification approach would be consistent with the prece-
dent set by Miranda and Edwards, guaranteeing the
right to counsel and protecting suspects’ constitutional
rights.  This was the majority rule before Davis.  This
approach allows the police to continue questioning an
arrestee whose invocation was ambiguous, but only to
determine the suspect’s intent to exercise his right to
counsel.
As previously mentioned in the introduction, a
majority of federal courts have utilized the clarification
standard, which allows police officers to continue ques-
tioning an arrestee whose invocation was ambiguous or
equivocal solely for the purpose of determining the sus-
pect’s intent to exercise his right to counsel.  But under
Davis, depending on the interpretation of the lower
court, the burden is on defendants to clearly articulate
their request for counsel after they have already initially
declined such assistance.  A caveat is in order.  
The obligation for defendants to clearly ask for
an attorney before an initial waiver allows the speaker’s
expressed intent to be ignored.116 From my perspective,
and based on my criminal defense experience, I suggest
that the better approach is to require the police officer
to seek clarification from the suspect if he is unsure
whether the defendant is requesting an attorney.  Just
ask.  While Miranda requires all questioning to cease, a
question to clarify should be allowed and should not be
interpreted as an effort to elicit an incriminating state-
ment.  Under a clarification approach aimed towards ef-
ficient police practice, the police would follow
established guidelines during interrogations: when con-
fronted with an ambiguous request, the police must stop
and clarify.  At the same time, the individual’s constitu-
tional rights would be protected as that individual can
choose to either seek counsel or  continue with ques-
tioning.  Notably, this clarification approach was advo-
cated by Justice Souter in his Davis concurrence. 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Harry Black-
mun, John Paul Stevens, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, con-
curred with the majority.117 Although Justice Souter
believed the majority’s decision was correct, the stan-
dard adopted by the majority was not.  Justice Souter
agreed that Davis’ statements should not have been ex-
cluded from trial because he had not clearly requested
an attorney.118 Justice Souter, however, disagreed with
the majority’s standard with regard to a police officer’s
obligation to clarify an ambiguous request for counsel.119
In particular, he concluded that interrogators have the
legal obligation to clarify a custodial subject’s ambigu-
ous statement if the statement could be interpreted as a
desire to consult with an attorney.120
Justice Souter made three crucial points.  First,
IV.   JustICe souter AND the ClArIFICAtIoN AP-
ProACh: Just Ask - WAs It A request or Not?
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he believed that the clarification standard adopted by the
majority of the lower courts was a better alternative.121
Rather than allowing the police to continue interrogating
a suspect after an equivocal request for counsel, Justice
Souter would require police officers, following an am-
biguous statement, to ascertain whether the suspect ac-
tually wants an attorney. 122 This standard would not
only ensure that a suspect’s choice of whether to have
counsel during an interrogation will be “scrupulously
honored,” but would also provide a workable solution
to the misunderstandings that often arise between sus-
pect and interrogator.123 Justice Souter made the robust
claim that “the Miranda safeguards exist ‘to assure that
the individual’s right to choose between speech and si-
lence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation
process,’ and that the justification for Miranda rules, in-
tended to operate in the real world, ‘must be consistent
with . . . practical realities.’”124
Second, Justice Souter
suggested that the majority disre-
garded judicial restraint. Accord-
ing to Justice Souter, the
majority’s holding was not man-
dated by any of the Court’s prior
decisions, and for the majority to
assert otherwise was an erroneous
application of precedent. 125 Fi-
nally, Justice Souter pointed out
that the majority did not define
when an assertion is clear and
when it is not.126 He argued that
“every approach, including the
majority’s, will involve some ‘difficult judgment calls,’”
and police judgment calls, according to the majority,
would actually erode the bright–line test of Edwards.127
In  Souter’s view, officers have a non-assignable
legal obligation to ask necessary questions in order to
clarify any ambiguous statements made by a suspect. 128
In addition, Justice Souter noted that a large percentage
of criminal suspects lack a strong command of the Eng-
lish language, and many others are either so intimidated
by the interrogation process or so overwhelmed by the
uncertainty of their situation that they are unable to
speak assertively.129 With this in mind, Justice Souter
insisted that, because of these realities, the Court has tra-
ditionally required a broad interpretation of requests for
counsel.130
In her article, The Sounds of Silence: Reconsid-
ering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under
Miranda, Professor Strauss asserts that, 
[E]ven if Davis renders an ambiguous
statement insufficient to invoke a sus-
pect’s rights,  that statement should in-
fluence whether there occurred a valid
waiver…Even if not deemed an invoca-
tion per se, the statement can and should
be considered in deciding the validity of
any waiver.  Pre-waiver, ignoring such a
statement (or making a derogatory state-
ment about how not talking would hurt
the defendant’s cause) should render any
subsequent waiver invalid.  At a mini-
mum, the officers need to clarify the sus-
pect’s desire in order to satisfy the
waiver requirements.131
As an alternative, Professor
Strauss argues that the courts
should adopt a strict “stop-and-
clarify” method, which requires
officers to follow specific rules in
asking questions from a prepared
script about whether the suspect
wants counsel or not. 132 The of-
ficer would not be allowed to add
any editorial comments onto
these rigid rules.133 As applied to
the cases in this Recent Develop-
ment, both Justice Souter’s clari-
fication approach and Strauss’
approach would  ensure that a
suspect’s request for counsel would be honored, and as
a result, litigation and challenges to the statements
would be reduced or eliminated. 
After Davis, some courts utilized the Davis ra-
tionale and applied the so-called clarification approach
in a pre-waiver situation.  They have held that upon any
clear or equivocal request for counsel, the police must
cease all questioning and seek clarification of the sus-
pect’s request.  Accordingly, the police may continue
questioning unless the suspect unambiguously invokes
his rights, regardless of whether law enforcement offi-
cials have endeavored to clarify any ambiguity.134 As
discussed below, the courts that follow the clarification
rule will probably develop individualized standards and
associated definitions of “ambiguity,” which will de-
pend upon the facts and circumstances of each case that
arises during the development of these standards.
57Criminal Law Brief




his rights, regardless of
whether law enforce-
ment officials have en-
deavored to clarify any
ambiguity.
A. davis is Applicable even When a suspect 
makes an Ambiguous request for Counsel Before 
Waiving Miranda rights
Several courts have applied the Davis doctrine
regardless of its timing.  The Massachusetts Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the Davis rationale is lim-
ited to  post-waiver ambiguity, not an ambiguous request
for counsel in the context of the initial advisement of
rights.  The court found no difference, however, between
applying the Davis rule to any waiver situation, either
before Miranda warnings or after, stating that “[c]ourts
have held that unless a suspect ‘clearly and unambigu-
ously’ invokes his right to remain silent, either before
or after a waiver of that right, the police are not required
to cease questioning.”135
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied
Davis to a pre-waiver situation in Abela v. Martin,136 a
case involving a stabbing death at a party.137 The suspect
was also injured and taken to a hospital emergency room
for treatment.138 At the hospital, the police officer was
interrogating Abela about the events when Abela stated,
“[m]aybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of
William Evans,” showing the officer Mr. Evans’ busi-
ness card.139 The officer then left the room, presumably
to contact Abela’s attorney.140 The officer came back to
the room and proceeded to Mirandize Abela, but never
made any mention of Mr. Evans.141 Nevertheless, Abela
signed the waiver form given to him and made a state-
ment.142 After being transported to the police station,
Abela made another statement to the police.143 The
Sixth Circuit distinguished the facts of Abela from those
of Davis and found Abela’s request for his attorney to
be unequivocal in nature, stating that “[a]fter Abela re-
quested counsel, the police were required to cease ques-
tioning him until he had a lawyer present.”144
In In re Christopher K,145 the Illinois Supreme
Court applied Davis’ objective test to a pre-waiver set-
ting and addressed whether the suspect’s articulation of
his request for counsel was sufficiently clear for a rea-
sonable officer in the circumstances to have understood
the statement as such a request.146 The court concluded
that respondent’s statement was not sufficiently clear to
invoke his right to counsel and based its reasoning on
the following:
The fact waiver has not yet occurred can
simply be subsumed into the objective
test.  That is, a trial court may consider
the proximity between the Miranda
warnings and the purported invocation of
the right to counsel in determining how a
reasonable officer in the circumstances
would have understood the suspect’s
statement.147
Notably, the Texas Supreme Court issued a rare
suppression ruling in a juvenile case.  The court in In
the Matter of H.V. 148 found that a juvenile who told a
magistrate that he “wanted his mother to ask for an at-
torney” invoked his right to counsel before police inter-
rogated him about a murder.149 H.V. was a
sixteen-year-old Bosnian native who was seen leaving
his high school with the victim two days after buying a
gun.150 A police detective met with H.V. at his high
school the day after the victim’s body was discovered
at a construction site with gunshot wounds to his head.151
H.V. voluntarily accompanied the detective to a juvenile
processing center where the magistrate asked H.V.
whether he wanted to waive his rights and speak to the
police.152 When H.V. said he wanted to speak to his
mother, he was informed that he could not speak to his
mother to ask for an attorney.153 Despite H.V.’s reminder
to the magistrate that he was sixteen years old, the mag-
istrate told him that H.V. was the only person who can
request an attorney.154 H.V. later provided a written
statement in which he claimed that the victim acciden-
tally shot himself with H.V.’s gun. 155
The majority opinion referred to Davis and pro-
vided examples of what constituted a valid request for
counsel.156 The court recognized that, “[t]here appear
to be no cases answering whether a juvenile’s age is
among the ‘variety of other reasons’ courts cannot con-
sider when deciding whether an accused has requested
counsel.”157 The court later determined that, “[t]his is
not a case in which H.V. simply wanted to see his
mother; the only reason he said he wanted her was for
the purpose of getting him an attorney.”158
Seemingly, not only are these courts reading
Davis as saying that it applies in pre-waiver situations,
but also that any request for counsel, either before or
after waiver, must be made clear by the suspect.  The
burden of clarification rests squarely on the shoulders
of the suspect.
V. From Leyva to roBinson: Pre-WAIVer
AmbIGous requests For CouNsel
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b.    Potential Abuses of davis and Police 
Interrogation tactics
Davis allows a great deal of leeway for police
interrogators because it says nothing about the manner
in which interrogators are permitted to respond to an
ambiguous request for an attorney.  As a result, inter-
rogators may feel latitude in employing tactics to deflect
suspects from invoking their right to an attorney.159
In my previous work as a public defender, I lis-
tened to the many narratives from my clients about how
the police would not provide Miranda rights when they
should have.  In these situations, officers frequently
claimed that they were asking only routine investigation
questions of my clients who were or were not suppos-
edly under arrest.  Sometimes that was true.  Other
times, it appeared to be a pre-text to elicit incriminating
statements.  Regardless of the motive of the police,  this
gives a great deal of leeway in their information gather-
ing.  Professor Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor,
observes, 
The police are very good at getting sus-
pects to talk, even after they give sus-
pects Miranda warnings. . . Officers get
people to talk by methods that include
lying about the evidence in the case,
lying about witnesses, and lying about
the likelihood of prosecution.160
Because the police are trained in interrogation
tactics, they are significantly advantaged over even the
most cunning of criminal suspects.  According to Pro-
fessor Charles Weisselberg, in California police recruits
in basic academy training are instructed that after sus-
pects receive and acknowledge that they understand
their rights, suspects must either waive or invoke that
right; continuing training materials are provided to po-
lice officers as well.161 The police can use various tac-
tics when suspects consider a request for counsel
including: (1) leading suspects to believe that, by invok-
ing their right to have an attorney present, it may make
it difficult to tell their story to the police; and (2) giving
the impression that they would not be able to take ad-
vantage of the benefits of cooperating with the police.162
Essentially, even when officers work within the bound-
aries created by Miranda and Davis, they can still em-
ploy whatever trickery or psychological coercion that
the Miranda Court considered.
Ten years after Davis, in Missouri v. Seibert,163
a particularly egregious abuse case came before the
Court.  Seibert was convicted in state court of second-
degree murder.164 Seibert feared facing charges of neg-
lect when her son, afflicted with cerebral palsy, died in
his sleep.165 Instead, she helped arrange for her son’s
body to be incinerated in the family’s mobile home.166
After her arrest, Seibert was not given Miranda warn-
ings and was questioned for thirty to forty minutes until
a confession was obtained.167 At one point the officer
squeezed Seibert’s arm.168 After a twenty minute break,
the officer returned, provided her with Miranda warn-
ings, and obtained a signed waiver from her.169 The in-
terrogation resumed and, when confronted with her
pre-warning confession, Seibert repeated the informa-
tion.170 At trial, the interrogating officer revealed that
he employed questioning techniques that required him
to withhold Miranda warnings, to question Seibert, to
then give Miranda warnings, and to repeat his question
until he received the answer previously given.171
At issue was the police practice of providing no
warnings of the right to silence and counsel until a con-
fession is obtained through interrogation.172 The Court
was to determine the admissibility of the repeated state-
ment.173 Justice Souter wrote for the Court, joined by
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, holding that Mi-
randa warnings given mid-interrogation where an un-
warned confession was produced were ineffective and
therefore the confession was inadmissible at trial.174 Ac-
cording to majority opinion, the repeated statement was
inadmissible “[b]ecause this midstream recitation of
warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession
could not effectively comply with Miranda’s constitu-
tional requirement . . . .”175
The objective of the question–first tactic utilized
by the police was to render Miranda warnings ineffec-
tive by waiting for an opportune time to give the warn-
ings after the suspect confesses.176 The majority
recognized that “the question-first tactic effectively
threatens to thwart Miranda’s purpose of reducing the
risk that a coerced confession would be admitted.”177
Further, “[t]he unwarned interrogation was conducted
in the station house, and the questioning was systematic,
exhaustive and managed with psychological skill.
When the police were finished there was little, if any-
thing, . . . left unsaid.”178
Justice Steven Breyer’s concurrence was equally
critical in his criticisms of the police interrogation tech-
niques employed in Seibert’s interrogation.
Reference to the prewarning statement
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was an implicit suggestion that the mere
repetition of the earlier statement was not
independently incriminating. The implic-
itly suggestion was false . . . The tech-
nique simply creates too high a risk that
postwarning statements will be obtained
when a suspect was deprived of “knowl-
edge essential to his ability to understand
the nature of his rights and the conse-
quences of abandoning them.”179
Subsequently, as a remedial measure, Justice Breyer
proposed a Fourth Amendment type rule that “[c]ourts
should exclude the ‘fruits’ of the
initial unwarned questioning un-
less the failure to warn was in
good faith.”180
Academics were also crit-
ical of the conduct of the interro-
gation tactics in Seibert, as
Professor Yale Kamisar observed, 
[I]f the police really be-
lieved (as they expect the
rest of us to believe) that
a fresh set of Miranda
warnings, plus an addi-
tional warning explaining
the likely inadmissibility
of the earlier unwarned
statement, would com-
pletely “cure” everything and restore the
suspect to exactly the same position he
would have been in had he never made
the earlier unwarned statement, what do
the police gain by deliberately withhold-
ing the warnings in the first place and
giving the Miranda warnings and the
supplementary warning later?  Wouldn’t
it be a good deal simpler just to give the
appropriate warnings in the first place?181
When Davis and Seibert are considered together
a relationship may be drawn between ambiguous re-
quests for counsel and improper interrogation tactics.
Take a hypothetical case using the same facts as in Seib-
ert with only slight changes: the suspect remarked,
“‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” before they were Mi-
randized.  A court may rely on the rationale offered in
Davis and find that there would be no obligation by the
officer to clarify the statement (a pre-waiver situation).
If the same requests were made by a suspect after they
were Mirandized, then under Davis, a court may find
that there is no duty on behalf of police officers to clarify
such a statement and any incriminating statement would
be potentially admissible.  Such interrogation tactics
will not invalidate the suspect’s waiver of her right to
an attorney.  Unlike Seibert, most cases lack strong ev-
idence of the interrogator’s wrongful intent.
The notion that the police should not be allowed
to employ interrogation tactics that will undermine a
suspect’s understanding of the warnings was reiterated
by the Florida Court of Appeals in Dooley v. State.182
Dooley, who was accused of sex-
ual battery and lewd acts against
a minor said, “Um, I don’t wish to
waive my rights,” after he was
given his Miranda warning.183
Dooley later said during the inter-
rogation, “Um, I’m going to talk
to you,” and a confession re-
sulted.184 Later citing Miranda,
the Florida court held that Doo-
ley’s statement was not a waiver,
and the interrogation should have
ceased at that point.”185 The court
also found the interrogator’s indi-
cation that Dooley could speak to
the officer without the risk of his
statements being used in court
was improper, stating that “The
police may not use misinformation about Miranda rights
to nudge a hesitant suspect into initially waiving those
rights and speaking with the police.”186
C.    davis is Not Applicable: A Clear request is
Necessary only after Waiving Miranda rights
Several lower courts, unwilling to confront th-
Davis majority opinion, have held that Davis is limited
to post-waiver situations.  In State v. Leyva,187 the Utah
Supreme Court held that Davis did not intend to extend
to pre-waiver situations.188 In Leyva, the Utah Highway
Patrol noticed Leyva’s car leaning to one side on the
freeway when a State Trooper noticed that the car’s li-
cense plate had been issued to another car.189 A high
speed pursuit began when the trooper attempted to pull
Leyva over.190 The trooper read Leyva his Miranda
rights, and asked Leyva if he wanted to talk.  Leyva re-
sponded, “I don’t know.”191 Fifteen minutes later, while
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The notion that the po-
lice should not be al-
lowed to employ
interrogation tactics
that will undermine a
suspect’s understand-
ing of the warnings was
reiterated by the Florida
Court of Appeals in
Dooley v. State.
being transported to jail, Leyva asked the trooper about
the charge against him.192 The trooper told Leyva that
he was being charged with “Evading, improper regis-
tration, no driver’s license, no insurance, and possession
of cocaine.”193 Leyva said, “‘Hey, man, I’ll admit to
everything else, but the cocaine isn’t mine.’  [The
trooper] asked, ‘So you admit you saw my lights and
were trying to run from me?’  Leyva replied, ‘Yeah, I
was, but the cocaine isn’t mine.’”194
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the state’s broad
reading of Davis which purportedly supported their ar-
gument that officers are not required to limit their in-
quiry to clarifying the intent of the suspect, but could
continue questioning.195 The majority reasoned that
“[t]he Court in Davis made clear that its holding applied
only to a suspect’s attempt to reinvoke his Miranda
rights ‘after a knowing and voluntary waiver’ . . . .
Plainly the court in Davis did not intend its holding to
extend to prewaiver scenarios . . . .”196
The Leyva analytical framework was adopted by
the South Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Tuttle,197
which held that Davis does not apply to pre-waiver sit-
uations, and where the accused has not yet validly
waived Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the
waiver before.198 In that case, officers arrived to the
scene of a verbal argument between Tuttle and another
gentleman.199 Officers then discovered another man
who was stabbed eleven times.200 Under interrogation,
Tuttle admitted to stabbing the victim three times.201
After a lengthy colloquy, Tuttle stated he did not want
to waive his rights but still wanted to talk with the in-
terrogator.202 The court found that Tuttle’s responses
during the interview indicated he knew that any admis-
sion would be incriminating and upheld the lower
court’s finding that he knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waived his Miranda rights.203 The court also
noted that the detective sufficiently clarified Tuttle’s in-
tent and that based on the totality of the circumstances
Tuttle waived his Miranda rights.204
The viewpoint that the Davis rationale should not
be extended to pre-wavier situations gained traction at
the intermediate court of appeals level.  The Maryland
Court of Appeals relied on Leyva, and declined to extend
Davis in Freeman v. State.205 Freeman was convicted
of shooting to death her boyfriend.206 Freeman walked
into a police station and announced, “I just shot some-
one.”207 Freeman responded to the Sergeant’s question
about which hand she used to shoot the victim.208 The
Sergeant then advised Freeman of her Miranda rights.209
She indicated that she understood her rights, but said
nothing about waiving them.210
Later Freeman waived her rights by initialing each
question on the waiver form.211 In response to question-
ing, Freeman explained where and when she purchased
the gun, that the gun is normally kept underneath the
front seat of her car, and that she did not have a permit
for it even thought she knew it was against the law.212
The court stated,
While there may well be sound reason to
apply the logic of Davis to the matter of an
ambiguous invocation of the right to si-
lence that follows a valid waiver of Mi-
randa rights, that logic does not extend to
an ambiguous invocation that occurs prior
to the initial waiver of rights.213
The court sua sponte presented the issue of
whether the rationale of Davis applies to an ambiguous
invocation made prior to wavier of rights, but it was per-
suaded by the Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning in Leyva
and declined to apply Davis to a prewaiver context
analysis.214
The next year, the Alabama Criminal Court of Ap-
peals was persuaded by Freeman v. State when it ad-
dressed the issue of whether pre-waiver Davis applied
and essentially adopted the Freeman analysis in State v.
Collins.215 There, Collins gave a videotaped statement
to the Montgomery Police Department Officer, in which
she admitted that she was involved in a fatal hit-and-run
accident.216 The Court determined that she was not pay-
ing attention to the road, and was looking for something
in her purse on the backseat.217 Collins said that she hit
something that caused her car to swerve, noticed that
her windshield was broken, and saw a girl lying on the
road.218 Collins further said she did not stop but returned
to work and did not contact the police despite seeing the
news coverage about the girl being killed.219 Collins
gave the statement without counsel present and claimed
that (1) she did not understand the right to counsel and
therefore she could not have waived it and (2) neither
officer present answered her question about how long it
would take to get an attorney.220
In finding that there was no knowing or voluntary
waiver of her Miranda rights, the majority wrote,
“Davis does not apply to this case.  Collins’s questions
were directed to the delay involved in obtaining a
lawyer, and she asked them before she signed the
waiver-of-rights form.”221 The court concluded that the
ambiguity of Collins’ questions required the interrogat-
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ing officer to ask follow-up questions to clarify the am-
biguity.222
In Robinson v. Arkansas,223 after a jury trial,
Robinson was convicted of first-degree murder.224
Robinson ran from the crime scene, was caught
after a pursuit, and was taken into custody.225 After
Robinson was read his Miranda rights from a pre-
printed card, the Sheriff asked him, “why are you
running from the police?”  Robinson answered, “I
don’t want to say anything right now.”226 The
questioning continued, and Robinson made sev-
eral incriminating statements.227
In the court’s opinion, written by Judge Jim
Gunter, Robinson’s response was construed as an invo-
cation of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and
the court determined that “[u]nder these circumstances
. . . the officer should have ceased his interrogation after
Robinson’s statement, ‘I don’t want to say anything
right now.’”228
While the court does not explicitly mention
Davis in its opinion, an analysis of Davis as applied to
Robinson is provided in Judge Annabelle Clinton
Imber’s concurring opinion, and in the dissent by Judge
Tom Glaze.  Judge Imber referred to the Arkansas Rules
of Criminal Procedure229 and the Davis decision, and re-
called that Davis allows a suspect to invoke his right to
counsel in any manner if he does so before waiving his
Miranda rights.230 The Imber concurrence averred that
“Robinson never waived his rights…his statement ‘I
don’t want to say anything right now’ was not required
by Davis to be unequivocal.  Rather, it was sufficient
because it was made in ‘any manner.’”231
However, Judge Tom Glaze disagreed with this
interpretation of Davis and explained in his dissent that
the invocation of a right to counsel need not be equivo-
cal or tentative during questioning.232 With this in mind,
he concluded that “Robinson’s attempted invocation of
his right to remain silent was equivocal because he
merely said that he did not want to say anything ‘right
now.’  Robinson’s response could reasonably be inter-
preted to mean that he might (or would) talk later, and
he did.”233
This section closely examines Rodriguez, Fry,
and Blackburn and discusses their similar rationales.
These three recent cases represent the view that in a pre-
waiver situation where the accused has not waived their
Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the waiver be-
fore proceeding with the interview (the burden is placed
on the officer, not on the suspect).  These courts required
that all questioning must stop, even when the most am-
biguous references to counsel is made. 
A. United States v. Rodriguez 
As briefly discussed in my introduction, in Ro-
driguez, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that its precedent before Davis, which re-
quired police officers to clarify any ambiguous requests
for counsel at any time during an interrogation, survives
Davis.  The facts are straightforward.  Rodriguez was
driving erratically and was pulled over in a National
Recreation Area in Las Vegas based on suspicion of in-
toxication.234 Before roadside sobriety tests could be
performed, the Ranger learned that Rodriguez was a reg-
istered felon and saw a pistol handle protruding from an
open bag in the bed of the Rodriguez’s truck.235 Ro-
driquez informed the Ranger that there was another
firearm under the driver’s seat.236 After providing Ro-
driguez with a Miranda warning, the Ranger asked him
if he wanted to speak.237 Rodriguez responded, “I’m
good for tonight.” 238 At trial, the Ranger testified that
he understood this as being Rodriguez’s willingness to
speak to him later, but not immediately.239 Rodriguez
responded to the Ranger’s questions and admitted that
the bag, the gun, and the silencer belonged to him.240
The court noted that in the context of a Miranda
waiver, the phrase “I’m good” may be interpreted in a
myriad of ways and reasoned that the statement could
have been an ambiguous invocation of the right to si-
lence.241 As such, the court then considered the need for
the Ranger to have clarified Rodriguez’s response.242
The court referred to the narrow holding of Davis, which
involved a post-waiver situation, and acknowledged the
decision’s limitations, which held that “‘after a knowing
and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law en-
forcement officers may continue questioning until and
unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.’”243 The
court noted that “[t]he text of the [Davis] opinion is . . .
narrowly drawn: it asks whether ‘further questioning’ is
permitted upon an equivocal or ambiguous invocation
of the right to counsel, or, rather, whether questioning
must ‘cease.’”244 The court further proclaimed that “to
V.     AnAlysis of United StateS v. RodRigUez, 
United StateS v. FRy, And State v. 
BlackBURn: The RighT ideA
62 Winter 2009
the extent Nelson requires pre-waiver clarification of a
suspect’s wishes… it has not been superseded by
Davis… Prior to obtaining an unambiguous and un-
equivocal waiver, a duty rests with the interrogating of-
ficers to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general
interrogation.”245
In concluding its decision, the court held that the
burden rests on the government and not on the suspect
to clarify any ambiguous statement, and as such, be-
cause the interrogator did not clarify Rodriguez’s
wishes, the district court erred in admitting his subse-
quent incriminating statement into evidence.246 The
court also noted, “if it is not unreasonable to ask a police
officer to administer the warning, it is also not unrea-
sonable to ask him to get an unequivocal waiver before
commencing general interrogation.”247
B.    United States v. Fry
The District Court for the
District of Idaho in United States
v. Fry relied on Rodriguez for an-
alytical support and joined other
courts in restricting Davis’ hold-
ing to facts arising in a post-
waiver context.248 The court
suppressed Fry’s statements be-
cause his request for counsel was
intentionally ignored; Fry did not
have to make a specific clear re-
quest in a pre-waiver context.249
In this case, Fry was driv-
ing his pickup with two passen-
gers and was pulled over by
police officers during a traffic
stop.250 The officers found a pipe
and syringe and placed Fry under
arrest for unlawful use of drug
paraphernalia.251 The officers
then initiated conversation with Fry without providing
any Miranda warnings.252 They informed Fry that he
was the subject of a methamphetamine distribution in-
vestigation.253 Fry asked, depending on the differing ac-
counts, either “Do I get to have a lawyer to sit in?” or
“Do I need an attorney?”254 One of the interrogators at-
tempted to “soften-up” Fry by telling him of the poten-
tial charges he faced and of the advantages of
cooperating with the investigation.255 The dialogue con-
tinued despite the fact that Fry was neither provided any
Miranda warnings nor given a response to his “lawyer”
question.256 The officers never clarified Fry’s statement
regarding a lawyer.257 Fry was further informed about
potential charges stemming from the evidence of his al-
leged criminal activity and how they would stand in the
federal system, and was given further encouragement to
cooperate with police.258 Only then was Fry given his
Miranda rights.259
According to Judge Quackenbush, writing for
the court, the facts support a finding that Fry wanted a
lawyer and that the interrogator should have clarified
any ambiguity that may have existed.260 The court noted
that Fry’s statement regarding the need for an attorney
was made “prior to the reading of his Miranda rights,
prior to the subsequent waiver, and prior to the inter-
viewing agents’ ‘softening up’ and questioning.”261 The
decision was especially critical of the interrogator,
Agent Smith, and devoted a lengthy passage to his fail-
ure to address Fry’s request for a lawyer and to Smith’s
persistent questioning in an effort to elicit incriminating
statements.262 The court wrote,
“[t]he question was clear enough
that a reasonable officer in light
of the circumstances would have
understood that the suspect
might be invoking the right to
counsel.  As such, Agent Smith
had a duty to clarify the ambigu-
ity before proceeding with an in-
terview and interrogation.”263
The prophylactic rules
established in Miranda and Ed-
wards, which were intended to
preclude the type of questioning
tactics employed against Fry,
were especially helpful to the
court.  It concluded that the Mi-
randa and Edwards rules were
violated, and as such, Fry’s state-
ments should be suppressed.264
The court then proceeded to distinguish Edwards’ facts
from Fry’s circumstances: 
Though the court acknowledges that the
Edwards facts involved a “clearly as-
serted” invocation of the right to coun-
sel, the court finds that the unclarified,
pre-waiver, ambiguous reference to
counsel is most analogous to and must
be treated and analyzed as though it
were a clear request for counsel (thus
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[A] reasonable officer in
light of the circum-
stances would have un-
derstood that the
suspect might be invok-
ing the right to counsel.
As such, Agent Smith
had a duty to clarify the
ambiguity before pro-
ceeding with an inter-
view and interrogation.
triggering the protection of Edwards)
until and unless the suspect’s intent is
clarified otherwise.  This is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s “settled ap-
proach” that a defendant’s request for
counsel is to be given a broad rather than
a narrow interpretation.265
Perhaps echoing the Supreme Court in Seibert,
the Fry court concluded that Agent Smith’s failure to
clarify Fry’s statement and his “subsequent coercive di-
alogue and interrogation of the Defendant violated the
doctrines established in Miranda and Edwards,” render-
ing Fry’s subsequent confession tainted. 266
C.    State v. Blackburn
Last spring, the South Dakota Supreme Court in
Blackburn reiterated what it previously held in Tuttle:
in a pre-waiver situation where the accused has not yet
validly waived the Miranda rights, the officers must
clarify the waiver before proceeding with the inter-
view.267 As with Rodriguez and Fry, the Blackburn
court determined that the burden is on law enforcement
and not on the suspect to clarify an ambiguous state-
ment.268
Blackburn was charged with the murder of his
girlfriend.269 He was initially stopped by the police
while driving the victim’s car.270 Blackburn was inter-
viewed twice.271 The trial court determined that any
statements by Blackburn during the first interview were
not admissible because Blackburn repeatedly said he
was drunk and would not answer questions until he was
sober.272 Blackburn’s requests for an attorney were ig-
nored.273 According to the court, “Blackburn requested
an attorney more than twenty-five times and also repeat-
edly refused to talk to anyone.  The interrogating offi-
cers did not heed Blackburn’s requests during the first
interview.  Blackburn was not permitted to call an attor-
ney at any time.”274
After being advised of his Miranda rights during
the second interview, which was videotaped,275 Black-
burn said,
I mean I’d like, I’d like there to be a
lawyer present just so I don’t fuckin’ step
myself over the deep end or nothing else,
but I mean at this point I really don’t see
why there needs to be one because I, I re-
ally I want to know that you guys
know.276
The interrogating officer did not clarify Blackburn’s am-
biguous and equivocal answers, and continued the in-
terrogation.277 Blackburn then made the following
admissions: (1) he was drunk and high on cocaine when
he was at the victim’s house when an argument ensued
and escalated into a physical altercation; (2) he punched
and stabbed the victim several times with a knife; and
(3) that he struck the victim’s head with a rock.278 Only
after these statements were made did the interrogating
officer attempt to clarify Blackburn’s earlier statement
about wanting a lawyer.279
On appeal, the State argued that (1) Blackburn’s
statement was not a request equivocal or otherwise, for
an attorney or to stop the interrogation and (2) even if
Blackburn’s request was considered an equivocal re-
quest for an attorney, his request was made after waiving
his Miranda rights, and the officer could therefore con-
tinue questioning absent a clear request.280
Justice Judith Meierhenry wrote the court’s opin-
ion and noted that several courts, including the Supreme
Court in Rodriguez, have held that police officers must
clarify an ambiguous waiver before proceeding with the
interview.281 The court explained that the trial court
properly applied Davis’ objective “reasonable person
standard” and determined that Blackburn’s statement
was ambiguous or equivocal.282 The “trial court was not
in error in finding Blackburn’s statement ambiguous and
in need of clarification before continuing with the inter-
rogation.”283 The State bore the heavy burden to demon-
strate that Blackburn knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights.  The court announced that
“[t]he ambiguity of his answer leaves the waiver of his
Miranda rights in question.  As such, the officer had a
duty to clarify Blackburn’s statement to determine if he
wanted an attorney.”284
From my vantage point, Rodriguez, Fry, Black-
burn, and the other cases discussed reached their proper
conclusions because they did not extend Davis, were
based on sound reasoning, and were consistent with
prior Supreme Court holdings.  This trend may evolve
into the majority rule in most jurisdictions.  Hopefully,
other courts will similarly find that in situations where
a suspect makes an ambiguous statement after being Mi-
randized, the police have an obligation to seek clarifi-
Vii.    ConClusion
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cation of that statement.  This clarification approach,
which places the burden on law enforcement, would be
consistent with Miranda. 
If nothing else, Davis and the subsequent cases
interpreting it invite judges, lawyers, and academics to
build on the arguments presented to create practical
moderate solutions to the issue of ambiguous requests
for counsel.  The limitations placed on ambiguous re-
quests for counsel under Davis seem destined to remain
in place.  Attorneys will likely continue to litigate over
this issue, just as the courts will continue to grapple with
this issue of when a suspect must be clear in requesting
a lawyer.
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